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Abstract—The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
into the terrestrial cellular networks is envisioned as one key
technology for next-generation wireless communications. In this
work, we consider the physical layer security of the communica-
tions links in the millimeter-wave (mmWave) spectrum which are
maintained by UAVs functioning as base stations (BS). In par-
ticular, we propose a new precoding strategy which incorporates
the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper (Eve)
compromising link security. We show that our proposed precoder
strategy eliminates any need for artificial noise (AN) transmission
in underloaded scenarios (fewer users than number of antennas).
In addition, we demonstrate that our nonlinear precoding scheme
provides promising secrecy-rate performance even for overloaded
scenarios at the expense of transmitting low-power AN.
Index Terms—5G, artificial noise, millimeter-wave, precoding,
UAV communications
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a growing demand of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), also known as drones, in plentiful applications gives
rise to the necessity for studying UAV wireless communi-
cations. Due to the flexibility in the size and the mobility,
UAVs are used in various applications in civilian, for in-
stance, search-and-rescue operation during the emergency and
droned based delivery service, as well as in military such
as airspace surveillance [1]. Moreover, such characteristics of
UAV enables UAV to be deployed as a flying base station
(UAV-BS) [2], and UAV-BS operates to improve coverage and
connectivity with ground users.
UAV wireless cellular networks is vulnerable to illegitimate
malicious receivers due to the broadcast nature. Traditionally,
cryptographic encryption is implemented at the network and
application layer to ensure security [3]. This technique is based
on the limited computational complexity of adversaries. The
physical layer security (PLS) has recently received attention as
an effective complement. The wire-tap channel is considered
in [4], which consists of a transmitter, intended receivers, and
an eavesdropper.
UAV trajectory and transmit power are optimized to max-
imize achievable secrecy rate on the wire-tap channel in [5].
A friendly jammer UAV, which transmit artificial noise (AN)
for the purpose of secure communications is introduced in
[6], and the trajectory and the transmit power of both source
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and jammer UAV are optimized. In [7], the BS equipped
with multiple antenna transmits artificial noise as a source
combined with data. In [8], precoders for both data and AN
are designed by well-known linear precoding with legitimate
user channels knowledge for the secure transmission.
In this paper, we study the PLS of broadband coverage
provided by a UAV-BS in mmWave frequency spectrum. In
particular, we consider transmission of AN in a smart fashion,
which takes into account not only the legitimate user channels
but also limited or full feedback on the Eve CSI. We propose
two precoding strategies that design precoders for both the
data and AN signal in linear and nonlinear fashions, which
utilize the available Eve CSI. We numerically show that the
proposed nonlinear precoding scheme with full Eve CSI offers
a promising secrecy-rate performance for both underloaded
(few users) and overloaded (many users) scenarios, where the
need for AN is even completely eliminated for underloaded
scenarios. The proposed linear precoding scheme also outper-
forms the conventional strategies not using Eve CSI, and is
very effective especially for underloaded scenarios even with
limited Eve CSI.
Notation: ‖ · ‖2 and ‖ · ‖F denote the Euclidean and Frobe-
nious norm operators, respectively. I is the identity matrix, C
is complex numbers. CN (0, αI) stands for complex Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and covariance matrix αI. Im{X}
represents the imaginary parts of matrix X. U [x1, x2] denotes
uniformly random distribution with the range from x1 to x2.
null(X) represents null space of matrix X.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a mmWave communications scenario where a
single UAV-BS flying at an altitude of huav serves K single-
antenna users with the index set K= {1, . . . ,K}. The users are
assumed to be deployed uniformly on the ground with dk being
the horizontal distance (on the ground) between the UAV-BS
and k-th user such that dk ∼U [dmin, dmax]. The correspond-
ing communication is being wiretapped by a single passive
eavesdropper (Eve). The UAV-BS and Eve are equipped with
vertically positioned uniform linear array (ULA) having N
and M antenna elements, respectively. We assume that the
UAV-BS serves the users within the same spectral (i.e., time
and frequency) resources (without any scheduling) through a
multiuser all-digital precoding scheme. In order to improve the
resiliency against possible Eve operations and enable secure
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Fig. 1. Illustration of system scenario with UAV-BS wireless networks.
transmission, the UAV-BS transmits AN along with the user
messages using the same spectral resources.
The received signal at the u-th user is given by
yu =
K∑
k=1
√
PTxhHuwksk +
Z∑
i=1
√
PTxhHu vizi + nu, (1)
where PTx is the transmit power at the UAV-BS, hu ∈ CN×1
is the u-th user’s channel vector, W = [w1, . . . ,wK ] ∈ CN×K
is the aggregate data precoder matrix for user messages
with wk being the precoder for the k-th user message sk,
V = [v1, . . . , vK ] ∈ CN×Z is the precoder matrix for the AN
transmission with vi being the precoder associated with the i-
th AN vector zi, Z ≤N −K represents the degrees of freedom
available for the AN transmission, and nu is the respective
observation noise following CN (0, σ2n). Similarly, the received
(wiretapped) signal at the Eve is given as
ye =
K∑
k=1
√
PTxHHe wksk +
Z∑
i=1
√
PTxHHe vizi + ne, (2)
where He ∈ CN×M is the channel matrix of Eve, and ne ∈
CM×1 is the observation noise following CN (0, σ2nI).
The channel between the UAV-BS and k-th user is given as
hk =
√
N
Lp
Lp∑
`=1
αk,`
PL (dk)
aN (θk,`), (3)
where Lp is the number of multipaths, αk,` is the small-scale
fading of the k-th user along the `-th path being standard
complex Gaussian, PL (dk) is the path loss for the k-th user,
and θk,` is the angle of departure (AoD) for the `-th path with
the array steering vector given as
aN (θ) =
1√
N
[
1 e−j
2pids
λ sin θ . . . e−j
2pids
λ (N−1) sin θ
]T
, (4)
where ds and λ are the antenna spacing and wavelength of
the carrier frequency fc. Note also that we assume that the
AoD is Laplacian distributed around the line-of-sight (LoS)
angle θLoS with the angle spread of ∆. In a similar fashion,
the channel between the UAV-BS and Eve is given as
He =
√
NM
Lp
Lp∑
`=1
αe,`
PL (de)
aN (θe,`)aHM (ψe,`), (5)
where αe,` is the small-scale fading along the `-th path,
de is the horizontal distance between the UAV-BS and Eve
following U [dmin, dmax], and θe,` and ψe,` are the AoD and
angle of arrival (AoA) associated with the `-th path where
AoA has the same distribution as AoD.
III. PRECODER DESIGN FOR SECURE TRANSMISSION
In this section, we present the achievable secrecy rate, and
overview conventional precoder design schemes associated
with the data and AN transmission to enable secure communi-
cations. To this end, we first express the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the u-th user as follows
SINRu =
wHu huh
H
uwu∑K
k 6=u wHk huh
H
uwk +
∑Z
i=1 vHi huh
H
u vi + ρ−1
, (6)
where ρ= σ
2
n√
PTx
is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). In addition,
the SINR of Eve is given as follows [8]
SINRe = wHuHe(H
H
e VV
HHe + ρ−1I)−1HHe wu, (7)
where (7) is equivalent to the maximum SINR at the MMSE
combiner [9]. We assume the worst-case that the Eve is able
to decode and cancel the signals of UAV-BS except the signal
of interest. The achievable secrecy rate of the u-th user is then
given as
Rsecu = [log(1 + SINRu)− log(1 + SINRe)]+ , (8)
=
[
log
(
1 + SINRu
1 + SINRe
)]+
, (9)
where [x]+ = max(0, x).
Assuming unit-energy overall precoding mechanism (i.e,
‖W V‖2 ≤ 1), the power allocated to data and AN precoders
is controlled as follows
‖W‖2 = φ, (10)
‖V‖2 = 1− φ, (11)
where φ is the power splitting factor. The well-known zero-
forcing (ZF), and regularized zero-forcing (RZF) precoding
schemes are defined for the data precoding part as follows
ZF: W˜ = H(HHH)−1, (12)
RZF: W˜ = (HHH + βI)−1H (13)
where H = [h1 . . . hK ] is the aggregate channel matrix. The
final data precoder for the k-th user is given accordingly under
the uniform power allocation assumption as follows
wk =
√
φ
K tr(w˜Hk w˜k)
w˜k, (14)
where w˜k is the k-th column of W˜.
The well-known strategy for designing AN precoder is null-
space precoding, which is defined as
V˜ = null(HH), (15)
and the final precoder vectors are obtained through uniform
power allocation as follows
vi =
√
1− φ
Z tr(v˜Hi v˜i)
v˜i, (16)
where v˜i is the i-th column of V˜.
We would like to remark that the conventional data pre-
coders in (12)-(14) take into account the users only, and
try to mitigate the interference coming from the multiuser
communications (i.e., all the users are being served using the
same spectral resources). In addition, the AN precoder in (15)-
(16) proceeds to suppress the ability of Eve to wiretap the
users’ messages by simply putting noise toward null space
of the user aggregate channel matrix (i.e., towards directions
where no user is present). The conventional strategy, however,
does not utilize the Eve channel state information (CSI) (i.e.,
He) in either the data or AN precoding parts. In the next
section, we propose a new precoder design strategy where the
CSI of Eve is incorporated into the design problem.
IV. EVE-CSI-AWARE PRECODER DESIGN
In this section, we propose a new precoder design strategy
for the data and AN signal assuming full and partial CSI
(on the Eve’s channel) separately. We first consider a linear
scheme, which benefits from existing ZF and RZF precoders
but incorporates also Eve CSI. We then propose a novel
nonlinear precoding strategy which offers a promising secrecy-
rate performance.
A. Linear Precoding with Full vs. Limited CSI
In the AN transmission, the main goal is to put as much
power as possible towards Eve direction while not degrading
the legitimate user channels much. The AN transmission
is conventionally designed to happen towards the directions
within the null space of the user channel matrix H since the
CSI on the Eve channel is not benefited. We now propose
linear precoder design strategy for the data and AN signal
which employs not only the user channel matrix but also the
Eve’s CSI.
To this end, we first consider the singular value decompo-
sition (SVD) of the channel matrix of Eve as follows
He =
R∑
`=1
λ`u`dH` , (17)
where λ` is the `-th singular value with λ1> . . . >λR, u` and
d` are the left and right singular vectors, respectively, and R is
the rank of the channel matrix. Note that the mmWave channel
is sparse in the angular domain so that most of the energy
is focused around few directions. We therefore represent the
channel by a rank-1 matrix as follows
He ≈ λ1u1dH1 , (18)
where the right singular vector can be interpreted as the
dominant multipath direction towards Eve.
We consider a virtual channel matrix which aggregates the
user channel matrix and the dominant Eve direction described
in (18), which is given as follows
G = [H d1] . (19)
Treating Eve as if it is a regular user, the respective ZF and
RZF precoders are given as
ZF: F = G(GHG)−1 (20)
RZF: F = (GGH + βI)−1G (21)
where β is the regularization parameter, and F = [f1, . . . , fK+1]
is the aggregate precoding matrix. In this definition, fk is the
precoder for the k-th user for k∈K, and fK+1 is the precoder
for Eve. Note that in either ZF or RZF precoding scheme,
the k-th user precoder fk allocates maximum power towards
its desired user while suppressing the multiuser interference
associated with not only the other users but also Eve. Similarly,
fK+1 operates to put more power towards dominant Eve
direction while keeping the resulting interference at all the
users minimum. We therefore conclude that fK+1 indeed rep-
resents an effective candidate for AN precoder. The resulting
unnormalized data and AN precoders are given as follows
W˜ = [f1, . . . , fK ] , (22)
v˜ = fK+1, (23)
which take the form after uniform power allocation as follows
wk =
√
φ
Ktr(w˜Hk w˜k)
w˜k, (24)
v =
√
1− φ
tr(v˜Hv˜)
v˜. (25)
When the UAV-BS does not have full CSI of Eve, but has a
partial information in the form of Eve’s location, the aggregate
channel based on this relatively stationary LoS angle θLoS is
given as
G = [H aN (θLoS)], (26)
where aN (θLoS) is the array steering vector described in
(4). Although the limited feedback scheme in (26) is not as
accurate as the approximation in (19) relying on dominant Eve
direction, the respective secrecy-rate performance is shown to
be reasonable in Section V.
B. Nonlinear Precoder Design with Full CSI
In this section, we propose a non-linear precoding scheme
for the data and AN signal to further improve secrecy rates.
Towards this end, we first consider the optimization problem
that aims at maximizing sum secrecy rate, which is given as
max
W,V
K∑
k=1
[
log
(
1 + SINRk
1 + SINRe
)]+
, (27)
s.t.
K∑
k=1
‖wk‖2 +
Z∑
i=1
‖vi‖2 ≤ 1, (27a)
TABLE I
SIMULATION SETTINGS
Parameter Value
Transmit power (PTx) 30 dBm
Antenna element spacing (ds) λ2
Number of antennas at UAV-BS (N ) 16
Number of antennas at Eve (M ) 4
Number of users (K) {4, 16, 32}
Distance distribution (U [dmin, dmax]) U [10, 100] m
UAV-BS altitude (huav) 100 m
Carrier frequency (fc) 28 GHz
Bandwidth (B) 100 MHz
Noise figure 9 dB
Thermal noise -174 dBm/Hz
Number of multipaths (Lp) 5
Angular spread (∆) 10◦
AoD/AoA distribution Laplace
which is obviously non-convex, and requires sophisticated nu-
merical optimization methods to solve. We therefore propose
an alternative optimization problem which aims at minimizing
the transmitted power while satisfying particular SINR con-
straints for each user and Eve. The respective optimization
problem is based on the SINR balancing strategy [10], and
the proposed optimization scheme is described as follows
min
W,V
K∑
k=1
‖wk‖2 +
Z∑
i=1
‖vi‖2 , (28)
s.t. SINRk ≥ γk, ∀k ∈ K, (28a)
SINRe ≤ γe, (28b)
where γk and γe represent the target SINR for the k-th user and
Eve, respectively, to achieve a specific secrecy rate, and, hence,
can be interpreted as quality-of-service (QoS) metrics for the
underlying secure transmission scheme. Note that although the
original SINR balancing problem of [10] considers only the
minimum SINR threshold for the legitimate users (i.e., γk’s in
(28a)), our strategy employs also the maximum SINR threshold
for Eve (i.e., γe in (28b)). In addition, our objective function
in (28) involves the precoders for not only the data but also
the AN signal, which makes the solution even more difficult.
In an attempt to obtain a solution to the optimization
problem in (28), we assume that the AN precoder is available
a priori. The desired optimization can then be written for the
unnormalized data precoder matrix W˜ with the help of (6) and
(7) as follows
min
W˜
K∑
k=1
‖w˜k‖2 , (29)
s.t.
∣∣hHk w˜k∣∣2 ≥ γk(∥∥hHk W˜k∥∥2F + ∥∥hHk V∥∥2 + σ2n), (29a)∥∥HHe w˜k∥∥2 ≤ γe (∥∥HHe V∥∥2F + σ2n) ,∀k ∈ K, (29b)
where W˜k is obtained by removing the k-th column from W˜.
The objective function in (29) is a quadratic function of the
data precoders, and is therefore convex. In addition, (29b) is
also a convex function of the data precoders for a given AN
precoder matrix V.
Note that any phase rotation of the optimal data pre-
coder woptk , which is represented by w
opt
k e
jϕk for arbitrary
ϕk ∈ [0, 2pi], still achieves the optimal solution since such
phase phase ambiguities are eliminated by the absolute value
operators in (6). In order to reveal the convexity of the
constraint in (29a), we make use of this observation by
choosing the arbitrary ϕk such that the effective channel
gain of the k-th user, denoted by hHk w˜k, becomes real-valued
and nonnegative, i.e., hHk w˜k ≥ 0 and Im{hHk w˜k}= 0. The
respective optimization problem is accordingly expressed as
min
W˜
K∑
k=1
‖w˜k‖2 , (30)
s.t. hHk w˜k ≥
√
γk
∥∥hHk W˜k hHk V σn∥∥ , (30a)∥∥HHe w˜k∥∥ ≤√γe (∥∥HHe V∥∥2F + σ2n), (30b)
hHk w˜k ≥ 0, Im
(
hHk w˜k
)
= 0, ∀k ∈ K, (30c)
which is in the form of second-order cone programming
(SOCP), and can be solved by standard convex-optimization
solvers (e.g., MATLAB CVX). The solution of (30) is still
cumbersome in terms of picking up appropriate SINR thresh-
olds γk and γe for k∈K. As a practical yet efficient solution,
we obtain these thresholds from the SINRk and SINRe results
associated with the RZF precoding given in (21). Note that
the final data precoders with normalized power are calculated
by (24), and the initial AN precoder is obtained by (25).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results based on
extensive Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the performance
of the proposed precoding strategies in comparison to the con-
ventional designs. We adopt the urban micro (UMi) mmWave
path-loss model by 3GPP given (in dB scale) as follows [11]
PL (dk) = 32.4 + 21 log10
(
d LoSk
)
+ 20 log10 (fc) , (31)
where d LoSk =
√
d2k + h
2
uav is the LoS distance of the k-th user,
and fc is the carrier frequency (normalized by 1 GHz). The
complete list of the simulation parameters are given in Table I.
In Fig. 2, we depict sum secrecy rates along with varying
power splitting factor such that φ∈ [0, 1], N = 16, M = 4,
and K ∈{4, 16, 32}. We observe that the proposed nonlinear
precoder design is superior to both the conventional and
proposed linear precoding strategies. In addition, the proposed
linear precoding schemes involving either ZF or RZF (with
Eve CSI) achieve a better sum-rate performance as compared
to the conventional linear schemes (without Eve CSI). Note
that this performance improvement in linear precoders (asso-
ciated with the use of Eve CSI) diminishes as the number
of users increases, and becomes marginal in the overloaded
scenarios (e.g., Fig. 2(c)). Note also that, the performance
of ZF precoder with or without Eve CSI deteriorates rapidly
along with increasing number of users, which directly follows
from the multiplication HHH in (12) being not invertible.
The sum-rate performance in Fig. 2 is observed to follow
generally an increasing trend along with the power splitting
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Fig. 2. Sum secrecy rate vs power splitting factor φ for PTx = 30 dBm,
N = 16, M = 4, and K ∈{4, 16, 32}.
factor φ. In particular, the conventional linear precoders (with-
out Eve CSI) have the best secrecy-rate performance around
φ∈ [0.8, 0.9] for the underloaded scenario of K = 4, as shown
in Fig. 2(a). On the other hand, the proposed linear and
nonlinear precoders with full Eve CSI achieves the best sum
secrecy rate for φ= 1 under the same setting. The proposed
linear precoders with limited Eve CSI, however, have their
peak corresponding secrecy-rate performance at φ∈ [0.9, 1.0].
These observations conclude that incorporating the Eve CSI in
the precoder design (as in the proposed linear and nonlinear
precoders) relieve the necessity of the AN transmission for
underloaded scenarios. In particular, the use of full Eve
CSI completely eliminates any need for AN (i.e., φopt = 1)
while the limited Eve CSI still requires small amount of AN
transmission (i.e., φopt< 1). Note also that limited Eve CSI has
a very close performance to full Eve CSI for proposed linear
precoders in underloaded scenarios (except still requiring AN
transmission).
As the number of users increases and the setting becomes
overloaded (e.g., Fig. 2(c)), the linear precoders cannot provide
a promising secrecy-rate performance irrespective of using
any Eve CSI or not at all. The proposed nonlinear precoder,
however, has a significantly better sum secrecy rates with
a peak at φ∈ [0.6, 0.8]. As a result, although the proposed
nonlinear precoder achieves a promising sum-secrecy rate for
overloaded scenarios, it is not possible to get rid of AN
transmission completely (in contrast to underloaded scenarios).
VI. CONCLUSION
We study physical layer security for UAV-BS communica-
tions in mmWave frequency spectrum which considers trans-
mission of AN to improve secrecy rates. We propose linear
and nonlinear precoding schemes which takes into account full
or limited feedback on the Eve CSI. The proposed nonlinear
precoding scheme is shown to outperform any other candidate
schemes, which is capable of eliminating any necessity for AN
transmission in underloaded scenarios. The proposed linear
precoding scheme is also shown to be very effective as com-
pared to the conventional schemes, especially for underloaded
scenarios.
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